Torbjörn Törnkvist och Gunvor group nämns i flera av de hemliga rapporter som amerikanska diplomater skickade hem till utrikesdepartementet och som läcktes genom Wikileaks förra året.
I rapporterna diskuterar bland annat amerikanska diplomater i Moskva den kontroversiella oljehandeln med centralt placerade oljehandlare och ryska oppositionspolitiker.
Nedan återges två av telegrammen med namnen på källorna anonymiserade.
In English:
Torbjörn Törnqvist and Gunvor group is mentioned in several of the secret reports from US diplomats to State department that were unveiled in the Cable gate leaks by Wikileaks last year.
In the cables US diplomats discuss the controversial Russian oil trading with centrally placed traders and Russian opposition politicians.
Here are two of the cables with the names of the sources redacted.
Telegram 1
08MOSCOW3380: C) OIL TRADERS: PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL OPAQUE; SEABORNE TRADE MORE COMMERCIAL
KEY
604
ID
08MOSCOW3380
SUBJECT
C) OIL TRADERS: PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL OPAQUE; SEABORNE TRADE MORE COMMERCIAL
DATE
2008-11-24 06:06:00
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN
Embassy Moscow
TEXT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003380
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT
EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR)
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF
EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: (C) OIL TRADERS: PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL
OPAQUE; SEABORNE TRADE MORE COMMERCIAL
REF: A. MOSCOW 2880 B. MOSCOW 2632
Classified By: Econ MC Eric T. Schultz for reasons 1.4 (b/d)
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) The oil trading business in Russia has long been opaque, benefiting politically connected firms such as the secretive oil trading firm GUNVOR. Contacts tell us, however, that the business has lately become more transparent because seaborne trade is now largely conducted via commercial tenders and terms. They caution, however, that pipeline exports to Europe remain problematic. XXXXXXXXXXX, for instance, told us he believes the recent supply reduction to the Czech Republic (ref A) was politically coordinated. To the extent that a shift toward greater transparency has taken hold, it is another example of the role of international commerce and finance in forcing Russian businesses to behave commercially. End summary.
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RUSSIAN OIL TRADING OPAQUE
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¶2. (SBU) Oil traders at major Western companies explained to us recently that the market for physical oil trades is very developed globally and has two segments. One is comprised of major international oil companies who trade oil largely to optimize their own global operations -- to ensure the right amounts of oil are transferred to the right facilities at the lowest cost. The other is comprised of companies such as Glencore, Vitol, and others who serve as intermediaries simply trying to make money buying and selling oil using their marketing, shipping, or risk tolerance advantage.
¶3. (C) According to these experts, oil trading in Russia has had a reputation for secretive deals involving intermediary companies with unknown owners and beneficiaries. Oil exports from state-owned or state-influenced oil companies have reportedly been funneled through favored oil traders, potentially yielding billions of dollars of profits for these companies. Of particular note in the Russian oil trading business is the Swiss firm GUNVOR. The company is rumored to be one of Putin’s sources of undisclosed wealth, and is owned by Gennady Timchenko, who is rumored to be a former KGB colleague of Putin’s.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX estimates that GUNVOR may control up to 50% of total Russian oil exports. He and his lawyer told us recently that it is impossible to know the extent of GUNVOR’s penetration of the market, however, because the companies involved refuse to disclose this information. (Note: GUNVOR claims in its glossy but uninformative brochure that it “handles a third of Russia’s seaborne oil exports.” End note.) As XXXXXXXXXXX has discovered, verifiable information on the volumes and terms of oil trades is very difficult to come by.
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BUT BECOMING MORE COMMERCIAL
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¶5. (C) Managers at two western oil companies, however, explained to us recently that oil trading in Russia has taken a welcome turn toward greater transparency thanks to open tenders for seaborne exports. XXXXXXXXXXX told us in a recent meeting that oil trading via Russian seaports is now, in his view, “completely commercial.” XXXXXXXXXXX explained that during the last year and especially since Medvedev’s inauguration, there has been a deliberate and successful push by the state to ensure transparency and commercial terms for most of the oil exported from Russia via ports.
¶6. (C)XXXXXXXXXXX claimed his view is not just conjecture. He said it comes directly from hard numbers and evidence that he sees from his participation in tenders by Rosneft, Lukoil, and other major Russian oil companies. He said that while
MOSCOW 00003380 002 OF 003
GUNVOR rose based on the “administrative support” of the GOR, the government came to realize it could no longer promote GUNVOR at the expense of, for example, state-owned Rosneft and Gazpromneft. XXXXXXXXXXX said he believes the trend toward greater transparency in seaborne exports will continue XXXXXXXXXXX.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX painted a similar picture of oil trading in Russia, calling seaborne trade “open and transparent.” He added that domestic trading, while depending on middlemen, is now also largely commercial. XXXXXXXXXXX told us the Russian oil trading market is among the most difficult in the world, but that it also offers good opportunities and that XXXXXXXXXXX has built a “healthy business” here. He said he has seen great changes in the 1 1/2 years he has been in his current job, and suggested that much of the change has come as a result of the government’s push for greater transparency in the economy as a whole. He added that he believes this push has largely been driven by the financing needs of the state-owned companies.
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX was less impressed by the degree of transparency in the business, even for seaborne oil exports. He told us recently that while there are more open tenders and more participants for seaborne exports, “the same firms seem to often win.” He suggested that favored firms may get inside information and a “second chance” to bid. XXXXXXXXXXX agreed, however, that there has been a trend toward greater transparency, but cautioned that it is far from an “open and commercial” market. He highlighted Rosneft as a company that has evolved toward greater transparency, and Surgutneftegaz (another reported source of Putin’s illicit wealth) as a company that has not.
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PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL A PROBLEM
------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) All three company representatives noted, however, that the trend toward greater transparency stops with seaborne trade. They all said Russian oil exports to Europe through pipelines, especially through the southern Druzhba pipeline, is still a very opaque business. XXXXXXXXXXX said pipeline exports, in general, are inherently more political than exports from ports, and that the trade through southern Druzhba is so opaque that “no one knows who is getting what.” XXXXXXXXXXX said many in the business “wonder what goes on between buyers and sellers” along that route.
¶10. (C) As an example, XXXXXXXXXXX specifically cited the recent oil supply reductions from Russia to the Czech Republic (ref A). He said that despite claims by officials that “middlemen” were the problem, he did not believe that to be the case. He said producers generally offer their oil using formulas that include some premium on top of a base price, depending on the export market. He explained that just prior to the supply reduction to the Czech Republic (where Shell has a stake in a refinery), all producers demanded the exact same premium, $1.25 per barrel, which he said was 4 to 5 times the previous figure for that route. He believed this price increase was coordinated, and resulted in the re-routing of oil exports away from the Czech Republic.
¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said that in the case of the Czech Republic, the refineries involved had access to other supplies, but that there was indeed an additional cost associated with obtaining alternate supplies. He said similar demands for higher premiums have occurred with regard to deliveries to a German refinery partly owned by Shell, but that the refinery had more limited access to alternatives. In such cases, XXXXXXXXXXX explained, managers have to decide whether to run refineries at sub-optimal levels, or pay the higher costs.
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX also noted that oil exports to Hungary, by Transneft decree, must go through “a certain intermediary” (GUNVOR), which adds one dollar to each barrel. He said in a competitive market, by contrast, an oil trader might add anywhere from five to 20 cents “maximum” to the price of a barrel of oil.
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COMMENT
MOSCOW 00003380 003 OF 003
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¶13. (C) Oil traders play an important role in the market, helping provide liquidity and optimizing the operations of oil refiners and producers. However, while it appears that the GOR has realized that the more transparent and commercial the trading business, the better it is for Russia’s oil sector, it unfortunately has not decided to apply this realization uniformly. Greed, corruption, and geopolitical concerns still trump efficiency, especially with regard to certain export routes to Europe and with regard to certain connected oil traders, such as GUNVOR. End comment. BEYRLE
HEADER
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Telegram 2
KEY
616
ID
08MOSCOW2632
SUBJECT
XXXXXXXXXXX
DATE
2008-09-03 13:01:00
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN
Embassy Moscow
TEXT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002632
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT
EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR)
DOE FOR FREDRIKSEN, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF
EO 12958 DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PGOV, PHUM, RS
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXX
TRANSPARENCY
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX is seeking information about the companies’ relations with shadowy and reportedly Kremlin-connected oil trader GUNVOR. XXXXXXXXXXX he just wants to shed light on the fundamental need for transparency in Russia, where no one seems to care about “massive corruption.” XXXXXXXXXXX End summary
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“TOTALLY NON-TRANSPARENT”
-------------------------
¶2. (C) A primary and very large hurdle for those who analyze Russia’s oil and gas sector is the dearth of reliable information. News reports abound of large business transactions related to little-known companies and involving undisclosed sums. This lack of transparency is often discussed, but is seldom officially challenged. XXXXXXXXXXX
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX. Both XXXXXXXXXXX told us that the rising and reportedly massive volumes of trade through secretive Swiss-based oil trading firm GUNVOR were the genesis of the cases against Rosneft, Gazpromneft, and Surgutneftegaz. This trade was resulting in reportedly very large profits for GUNVOR and its secretive ownership, which is rumored to include Prime Minister Putin.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said he believes that XXXXXXXXXXXX and he is frustrated that nobody in Russia seems to care. According to XXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXX, GUNVOR has risen quickly to become the top trader of Russian oil exports, now responsible for up to 50% of the total. He is seeking information from the companies about their relationships with GUNVOR: trading volumes, the general terms of the contracts, and how this particular trading company was selected by the oil companies. The companies, have stonewalled -- their relations with GUNVOR are &totally non-transparent,” XXXXXXXXXXX complained.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX Transneft, the primarily government-owned oil transportation monopoly. XXXXXXXXXXX information related to 13 billion rubles ($530 million) that the company reportedly donated to “charity” in the last two years. According to XXXXXXXXXXX, the company gave more to charity than it spent on pipeline repair and maintenance or paid out in dividends. However, the company has refused to disclose any information related to its charitable contributions, including the names of the beneficiaries.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX
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WHO OWNS RUSSIA’S FOURTH LARGEST OIL COMPANY?
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¶7. (C) Of the companies XXXXXXXXXXX one stands out for its secrecy -- Surgutneftegaz. As with GUNVOR, the company is rumored to be one of Putin’s sources of undisclosed wealth. No one knows who the ultimate beneficiaries are of the company, XXXXXXXXXXX “Can you believe,” he told us, “that no one knows who owns Russia’s fourth largest oil company?” XXXXXXXXXXX told us that he personally does not believe Putin owns either Surgutneftegaz or GUNVOR since the Prime Minister does not really need to have a direct link to an asset to benefit from it.
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX added that all requests for information from Surgutneftegaz are routinely denied. After numerous requests and many instances of “not our department” responses, sometimes someone in the company provides some vague information that is “totally unverifiable.” XXXXXXXXXXX said that unfortunately little can be done but to sue, and those suits are clearly going nowhere.
--------------------------------------------- -
NO ILLUSIONS OF WINNING, BUT SUITS TO CONTINUE
--------------------------------------------- -
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX-------
COMMENT
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¶10. (C) Opacity is commonplace in Russian business, especially in the sensitive oil sector, and it is a major hindrance to modernization. Without a steady flow of verifiable information, efficient capitalism is impossible. XXXXXXXXXXX End comment. BEYRLE
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